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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
OF UTAH, by and through
its ROAD COMMISSION,

~'rATE

Plaintiff and Respondent

vs .
.JOSEPH DELBERT MARRIOTT and
HELEN H. MARRIOTT, his wife;
M. STEWART MARRIOTT and LAURA MARRIOTT, his wife; CALEB
MARRIOTT, a single man; GILBERT ENOS MARRIOTT and HELFJN A. F. MARRIOTT, his wife; and
ETHEL TRACY, a woman,

Case No.
11088

Defendants and Appellants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a condemnation case to acquire a total tract
of land from the defendants consisting of .83 acre of
l'aw unimproved industrial zoned property, located at
1

about 950 West Pennsylvania Avenue, Ogden, Utah.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT

The jury returned a verdict of $7,500 for the .83
acre taken and there was no remaining acreage for the I
question of severance damages to arise. The defendant~
subsequently moved for a new trial which was denied.
1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The plaintiff seeks an affirmation of the judgement
on the verdict of the lower court and the matter returned to the Second Judicial District in \Veber County for
a final order of condemnation vesting the plaintiff with
sole ownership of the subject property.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff adopts the statement of facts as contained in the Brief of Appellants with the following additional facts and exceptions.
The subject tract of vacant, unimproved, industrial
land containing .83 acre was a triangular shaped piece
of property located at the intersection of Pennsylvania
and 26th Street at about 950 West Pennsylvania Avenue,
Ogden, Utah. There were no structures except for a
barn from the neighboring tract to the northeast which
slightly encroached on subject property but was never
considered by any of the witnesses (Tr. 54).
The plaintiff relied on the testimony of Mr. Greg2

Austin, \-vho valued the .83 acre tract at $7,500. To
support his opinion ail to the market value of the subject
property, Mr. Austin used six comparable sales in the
same neighborhood as the subject property, which rangPd in price from $4.000 per acre to $6,750 per acre
(ri'r. 113).
or~'

The defendants relied on the testimony of Mr. Harold Welch, who valued the .83 acre tract at $35,000. In
support of Mr. Welch's opinion, he testified to four
sales, two on Wall A venue, one on Washington Blvd.
and another at Plain City, Utah. The neareilt sale to
the subject property that Mr. Welch used was about
two miles away (Tr. 81) (Tr. 82) (Tr. 85).

It is the plaintiff's position that the trial of this
case ·was conducted in a manner consistent with the law
and judicial process, and that each party had a fair
opportunity to present all their evidence and there was
no irregularity of a prejudicial nature that would justify
a reversal of the judgement on the verdict.
ARGUMENT
I
THERE WAS NO PREJUDICIAL ERROR
COMJ\UTTED BY THE TRIAL COURT FOR INQUIRING OF THE PROSPECTIVE JURORS AS TO
THEIR VIEWS ON THE CONDEMNATION LAWS
OF UTAH
Prior to the time the partieil exercised their per3

emµtory challenges m the instant case, the trial judge
asked the members of the jury to state their views as
to what they thought of the condemnation laws. It is
argued

h~r

the eounsel for the defendants that such qups.

tioning and responding answers set the .stage unfavorable to the defendants. The defendants on page 5 of
their brief have quoted a partial statement made by one
of the jurors. Since the quote in the Brief of Appellants
states only that portion which is favorable to their position, the entire statement is quoted as follows to show
the thinking of one prospective juror:
"I have never been a legislator, hut o t' coum
anyone having their propert~- taken should be
reimbursed for their fair market price of the
property that is being taken, and in the case
of coming right through the middle of tht> property and rendering the portion that rnight he
left at a less value, there certainly should he some
consideration given. On the other hand, as a taxpayer I don't think that any excessive payments
or grants should be made to the property owner.
'T'axes are high enough now" ('T'r. 20).
A pursual of the remaining statements reveals that
the concern of the prospective jurors, was that the condemnee should be ju.stly compensated. This was as pro·
minent as any other item. There was certainly· no co111ment that would indicate that any prospective juror was
going to treat the defendants in any way but fair.

If the juror8' respon8es to the questions were ll~
favorable to the plaintiff as suggested hy counsel for
4

tlw defendants, it would appear that such questions were
a very effective tool for the defendants to help smoke
out any jurors who might have feelings favorable to the
~tate.

ln the case of State v. Dodge, 12 Utah 2d 293, 365
P.2d

7~J8

(1961), this Court held that it was an error

for the trial judge to give prospective jurors intell-

igence tests and restrict the panel to those whom the
trial judge determined were qualified. This Court, however, went on to say that such error was not reversible
where there was no showing that the jury was not a fair
jury taken from a cross section of the community. The
trial court in the instant case never attempted to reRtrict the jury panel, but only attempted to expose any
personal prejudices an individual juror might harbor
against either party. There is certainly no showing in
the instant case that the jury was not a fair selection
from a cross section of the community.
This court recognized in the case of State Bank
of Beaver County v. Hollingshead, 82 Utah 416, 25
P.2d 612 (1933), that after it has been determined
that a juror possesses the necessary statutory qualifications, the court may not dismiss a juror on
its own motion. The defendants argue that if the
trial court cannot dismiss a juror on its own motion,
then it should not ask questions of the prospective
jurors which would help either party to exercise its

peremptory challenges. It is suggested that almost any
question the trial judge asks of a prospective juror may
result in an answer that would cause one of the parties
to exercise its peremptory challenge. The latitude of
the trial judge in examining prospective jurors is well
stated by this Court in the State Bank of Beaver case
on page 615 of the Pacific Reporter as follow8:
" ... The examination of the jurors after it has
been determined they possess the necessary statutory qualifications whether by court or otherwise, is for the purpose of ascertaining in the individual case their qualifications, relationship of
the parties, their interest, pecuniary or otlwrwise in the subject matter of the action, whether
or not they are united in business with either party, the state of mind of the jurors, and their powers or ability to act fairly and impartially upon
the matter that may be submitted to them."
Utah R. Civ. P. 47 (a), allows the trial judge to examine
a prospective juror with the same latitude as the parties'
attorneys.
In the case of State v. Gregarious, 81 Utah 33, 16
P .2d 893 ( 1933), the trial court directed a line of questions to individual members of the jury as to their views
on certain aspects of the criminal law. This court did
not find such line of questioning out of order but cautioned that such questions should be for the purpose of
determining the state of mind of the jurors rather than
warnings or admonitions. The alleged improper questions directed to the jury in the instant case were not ad6

monitions, but merely questions to determine their state

of mind and their willingness to act fairly and impartially.
The defendants contend that the trial judge in the
instant case committed prejudicial error by asking the
jurors their feelings toward the law of condemnation
and cited the case of State v. Thompson, 68 N.M. 219,
3GO P.2d 637 (1961), for their main source of authority.
ln the Thompson case counsel was not permitted by the
trial court to ask the jurors about their views as to the
law or what it should be, and such refusal was assigned
as grounds for reversal. The New Mexico Supreme Court
did not determine whether or not a reversal would have,
been justified if counsel had been permitted to examine
the jurors as to their views on the law.
The law is clear that the extent of voir dire examination is within the sound discretion of the trial court,
and its actions will not be disturbed except on a clear
sh01ving of abuse. The latitude in which a prospective
juror may be examined is well stated in 31 Am. Jur. Jury
sis 136 at 119 ( 1941), as follows:
"The information elicited in exammmg prospective jurors on voir dire serves the twofold purpose of permitting the court to determine whether
a venireman is qualified to act as juror, and aiding each party in the exercise of his rights to
peremptory challenges. Thus examination into
the qualifications, attitudes and inclinations of
jurors, before they are impaneled and sworn to

7

try a case, is necessarily indicent to the practice
of challenging. Only such examination can provide
the information or suspicion to constitute a basis
for the intelligent and practical exercise of challenges to accomplish desired-exclusion from the
jury of those who would act from prejudice or
interest or without qualification to judge soundly."

It is submitted that the voir dire examination of

the jurors in this case was not prejudicial to the defendants' case and was conducted in manner consistant with
the trial courts discretion.
It is further noted that the alleged error has been

asserted for the first time on appeal and was never
raised at the trial of the case.

II

PERMITTING THE JURY ':rO VIEW THE
PREMISES IS WITHIN THE SOUND DISCRETION OF THE TRIAL COURT, AND THE EXERCISE OF THAT DISCRETION SHOULLD NOT BE
DISTURBED UNLESS IT IS CLEARLY DEMONSTRATED THAT THE COlTRT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY A SHOWING THAT NO USEFVL
PURPOSE COULD BJ1J SERVED IN PERMITTING
THE VIEW AND THAT THE EFFECT OF SITCH
VIEW WAS PREJUDICIAL TO THE DEFENDANTS WITH A LIKELIHOOD THAT THE RESUL'l'S WOULD HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT IN
rrs ABSENCE.
8

1

1'he law has been stated by this Court and neighlioring jurisdictions, that the trial court within its sound
di:-netion may allow the jury to view the property

1

sought to be condemned, Balle v. Smith, 81 Utah 179, 17
P.2d 224 (1932), Barber v. State Highway Commission,
80 Wyo. 340, 342 P.2d 723 (1959), Wilkerson v. Grand
Ri 1.'!?r Dam Authority, 195 Old. 678, 161 P .2d 745 ( 1945).
'!'here is no specific rule for condemnation proceedings
in Utah, but the authority is apparently of common law
origin and adopted generally in the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. Utah R. Civ. P. 47(J), 53 Am. Jur. Trial sis
441, G (1941 ), Nichols Eminent Domain sis 18.3 (3d ed.
1962).
With the statement of this general principle of law
it would be well to review the trial transcript and evidence in the instant case to determine whether or not
any useful purpose could be derived from the jury view.

In view of the stipulation between counsels prior
to the trial, there can be no dispute that the acquisition
amounted to a total taking of the tract of land belonging
to the defendants (Tr. 46) (Tr. 47). It is also recognized
that although the freeway was not completed at the
time of the trial, the right of way fence was constructed
and there was extensive excavation and construction at
the point where the subject property had been (Tr. 39).
One of the questions that arises is whether the jury
eould benefit from viewing the site and the surrounding
9

neighborhood and streets which obviously influenced
the value of the subject property. It is submitted that
very little benefit could be gained if the jury were merely
taken to the site, allowed to observe where the property
had been and then returned to the court room. The court,
ho\vever, in its instruction to the baliff outlined a circuitous route for the jury to travel to and from the site
which allowed them to ob3erve the sunounding neighborhood and streets which became important issues.
At no time during the trial was there any dispute
about the following physical characteristics that could
have been seen by the jury if the subject property had
remained in its "before" condition:
1. Frontage on Pennsylvania Avenue and 24th St.
2. Level topography
3. Visibility to on-coming traffic

4. Confluence with the intersection of 26th Strert,
Pennsylvania Avenue and the Hooper Road often referred to as the five-point3 area.
The transcript will show that neither on cross examination of the defendants' expert witness, direct examination of plaintiff's expert witness or closing argument did the plaintiff attempt to discredit or penalize
the subject property for lack of the physical characteristics listed above. On the contrary the tenor of the testimony of Mr. Austin, plaintiff's expert witness, both
on cross examination and direct examination, clearly
advanced the idea that the subject property had all of
10

1

1

1

these desirable characteristics.

At no time did Mr.

Austin penalize the defendant's property for a lack
of frontage, level topography, confluence with the fivepoints area, visibility to on-coming traffic or accessihility. The significant point of dispute was whether
the subject property as of December, 1965, would have
supported a service station site of the proportions
advocated by the defendants' appraiser, Mr. ·welch.
As the question of a service station site being the
basis for the entire law suit, collateral issues developed
during the course of the trial as follows:
1. The volume of traffic on Pennsylvania A venue

2. The type of traffic on Pennsylvania A venue
3. The speed limit on Pennsylvania Avenue
4. Traffic back-up on the residential streets running into Pennsylvania A venue
5. Comparability
Avenue
6.

of

sales

on

Pennsylvania

Whether the residential neighborhood was
of the type that would help sttl.mul!lltel a
$35,000 service station site

In light of the issues that developed at the trial, a
trip to the site and a tour of the surrounding neighborhood around Pennsylvania Avenue should have been
of some benefit to the jury to help them better under11

stand the evidence and resolve the issues since the main
points of contention were still there to be seen.
In the Court's admonishment to the jury, it was explained to them that the view could not he considered as
evidence, and its only purpose was to help them better
understand the evidence. 'l'he court also cautioned the
jury that there was a substantial construction on the
subject property. The explanation of the court to the
jury regarding the view and routes to travel are found
in the transcript (Tr. 150).
In the Brief of Appellants counsel for the defendants
has cited a number of cases as authority for the proposition that the trial court in this case abused its discretion in permitting the jury view. There is very little dispute with the general principles of law on jury view that
was expounded by the appellant courts in these cases.
It is submitted, however, that a clear distinction exists
between the case at bar and the cases cited by the defendants in which the appellant courts held that the trial
court abused its discretion in permitting the jury view.

In the case of Stevens v. Memmott, 9 Utah 2d 37, 337
P.2d 418 (1959), involving the quiet title of mininf!; claims, this court held that a view of the disputed claim
would lead as much or more to confusion as it wonl<l
to clarity, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in refusing to permit the view. 8ince the Stevens case was
a situation in which the party requesting the view was
12

refused and assigned the refusal as error, it is difficult
to compare this case with the case at bar. rrhe same argument applies in the case of Balle v. Smith, 81 Utah 179,
17 P.2d 224 (1932), in which the court refused to permit
the view of a 1923 Ford Model 7 which was claimed to
be the same type as the one in which the plaintiff was
riding. This Court gave no clue in either the Stevens case
or the Balle case, as to whether a reversal would have
been warranted if the facts had been reversed, and the
parties objecting to the view had assigned the granting
of the view as error. In any event it is suggested that the
facts and evidence in the instant case do not warrant the
conclusion that the viewing of the site and the neighborhood, caused the jury to be confused or prejudiced. This
is particularly true if it is accepted that the main points
of dispute mentioned were still present to be observed
by the jury.
Counsels for the defendants have cited authority
from the Rhode Island Supreme Court to support their
a:-:signment of error on the question of view. These cases
are generally supportive of the general rule adopted in
most jurisdictions and expressed in the Brief of Appellants and this Brief.
The case of Ajootion 'V. Director of Public Works,
go R.I. 96, 155 A.2d 244 (1959), and the prior case of
State v. Smith, 70 R.I. 500, 41 A.2d 153 (1945), said that
the trial judge should require information regarding the
')
1·"

merits of a view when an objection is made on grounds
other than those purely legal. The Supreme Court in the

Ajootion case announced that since a reporter was not
present when the request was made, it would have to
examine the record to determine whether or not the circumstances warranted the view. After an examination
of the record the Supreme Court then concluded that the
customary purposes for the view were not present. rr'he
factors taken into consideration in declaring the view
prejudicial was the run down condition of the 2% story
wooden frame dwelling and that the condition of the
premises had materially changed for the worse.
rrhe plaintiff has little argument with the rules of
law advanced in the Rhode Island cases since the purpose
of the view in those cases were substantially different
from the purpose in the instant case. As pointed out
earlier, the desirable physical attributes of the defendant's property were never seriously challenged; the
real issues could still be observed by the jury.
In a recent Rhode Island case the Supreme Court
recognized the value of viewing the surrounding neighborhood and potential uses not withstanding the changed condition of the property being condemned. Susso v,
Housing Authority, 82 R.I. 451, 111A.2d226 (1955). The
Rhode Island Supreme Court on page 229 of the Atlantic Reporter stated:
'' ... the parties would probably disagree on a num·
14

ber of matters such as the accessibility of parcel
l to :Man ton avenue, the possible development of
railroad facilities, and the alleged interruption
of an integrated use with parcel 2. In view of
these circumstances and others, we cannot say
that the trial justice abused his discretion in granting the motion for a view.''
.
In the instant case the defendants' property in its
"before" condition was a vacant unimproved piece of
property which in the opinion of both valuation experts
had a use higher than the use to which it was being put.
The exhibits presented by both sides clearly demonstrated to the jury, the size and shape of the property,
its confluence with the five-point area and its accessibility which was never in dispute.
'l1 here are other cases in which the courts have held
that the jury view of property, where substantial changes have occured, did not constitute error or an abuse
of discretion of the trial court. See United States v. 2.4
Acres of Land, 138 F.2d 295 (7th Cir. 1943), Annot., 77
A.L.R.2d 571 (1961),0regon-Washington R. & Nav. Co.
v. Campbell, 34 Idaho 601, 202 Pac. 1065 (1921). Utah R.
Civ. P. 47(J), suggests the propriety of allowing the
jury to view the property or the place of any material

fact as follows :
'' Vllien in the opinion of the court, it is proper
for the jur~· to have a view of the property which is the subject of litigation, or of the place in
which any material fact occured, it rnav order
them to h~ conducted in a body under th~ charge
1;)

of an officer to the place which should he shown
to them by some person appionted by the court
for that purpose ... ''
On page 1G of the Brief of Appellants, counsels for
the defendant.-; indicates how the alterations madr it
impossible for the jury to see two important characteristics namely accessibility and view. This would be a
legitimate argument had these two items been a point
of dispute. The plaintiff's appraiser never penalized
the defendants' propert>· for a lack of tltese two important characteristics, as a matter of fact he admitted
that the accessibility and view were good (Tr. 139) (Tr.
140).

1

The cases of South Park Com'rs v. Livin9sto11
344 Ill. 368, 176 N.E. 546 (1931), and City of Akron v.
Alexander, 5 Ohio St.2d 75, 214 N.K2d 89 (1966), cited
by the defendants add very little to the general principles regarding the discretion of the trial judge in permitting a view, except to show that the courts are reluc·
tant to construe the statutes as mandatory.

1

The ease of City of Chicaqo v. Koff, 341 Ill. ;)20, 173
NE. 666 (1930), cited by the defendants is ea:-iil~· di~
tinguished from the instant case. In the Koff case the
taking involved a four story brick building, the valne
of which was one of the main points of contention. 'rhe
Koff case shows that between the time of the taking and
the court proceedings, which was more than four years,
the building was still on the property but had been
16
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I

vacated and had substantia1ly deteriorated in the intrum.
ln the instant case there was no building or improvment in the taking but only raw land and the physical
characteristics of such raw land was not disputed.
It was never the plaintiff's position that the subject

property 1vas not a good service station site because it
lacked frontage, visibility, accessibility or any other physical characteristic that might not have been clearly visible
at the time of the jury view. It was merely the plaintiff's
position that because of the type and quality of the surrounding neighborhood, quality of traffic on Pennsylvania Avenue and the general locality of the site, that
it would not have supported a major service station of
the proportions testified to by the defendant's expert
witness. It is therefore submitted that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in permitting the jury view.

III
'l'Hl<J LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN PERi\lITrrING :MR. GEORGE M. JAY TO GIVE HIS OPINION AS TO THE DESIRABILITY OF THE SUBJEC11 PROPERTY AS A SERVICE STATION SITE.
'l'he plaintiff subpoenaed Mr. George M. Jay from
Ogden, Utah for the purpose of giving his opinion as
to the desirability of the subject property as a service
station site. The testimony of Mr. Jay showed that he
was a Sales Representative for Standard Oil Company
with a business address at West Pennsylvania Avenue

17

(Tr. 91). l\Ir. Jay testified that he was familiar with the
intersection of 26th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue
prior to the construction of the freeway (Tr. 94). Mr.
Jays discussion of desirable service station characteristics consisted mainly of proper traffic conditions and
neighborhood traffic ('l'r. 92) ('l'r. 93). The testimonv
further sho'wed that it was l\f r ..Jay's job to supervise
Chevron Stations and sell them merchandise (Tr. 91).
Based on Mr. Jay's experience in the service station
business, his knowledge of Pennsylvania A venue and his
knowledge of the subject property at the intersection of
26th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue, he was asked to
give his opinion as to what type of service station site
the subject property would make. Over the objection.~ of
the defendants' counsel Mr ..Jay was allowed to state
his opinion. l\f r. Jay was not called as a valuation witness and never put a price on the subject property.
The law with respect to review on appeal of decisions of the trial court as to qualifications or competency of expert witnes.:; is generally stated in Annot., 166
A.L.R. 1067 (1947) as follows:
''The courts are universally agreed that the
qualifications and competency of one to give opinion evidence as an expert is primarily in the discretion of the trial court, and the admission or
exclusion of such testimony on the grounds that
the witness was or was not qualified to testify
as to his opinion as an expert, will not be reviewed
or reversed by the appellant court except where
18

such discretion has been abused ... ''
In the case of Weber Baf>in Water District v. Nelson

1l Utah 2d 253, 358 P .2d 81 (1960), this court held that
the question of foundation and qualifications of a witness to state an opinion is a matter of discretion of the
trial court and the exercise of the discretion will not
be disturbed except in extreme cases of abuse. It is the
plaintiff's position that the Weber Basin case is directly
in point with this case and should be controlling.
rrhe fact that a witness may have limited qualifications or exverience rnight tend to depreciate the weight
of his testimony but ~would not make him incompetent
to testify. Provo River Water Users' Assn. v. Carlson,
103 1Ttah 93, 133 P.2d 777 (1943). This Court recently
held in the case of State v. Taggart, 19 Utah 2d 247, 430
P.2d 167 (1967), that:
"It is within the province of the jury to give
such weight to the testimony of each of the experts as the jury thought it was entitled to and
it was for the jury and the jury alone to decide
what weight, if any should be given to the testimony of any witness." (167 P.2d at 169)

A review of the cited authorities reveals that the
appellant courts are very reluctant to disturb the lower
courts determination of proper qualifications and competency of a witness.
An examination of Mr. Jay's testimony shows
that he was familiar with the area of the subject pro19

perty, and that he has had con.siderable experience in
the service station business for a number of vears
. .
On the basis of Mr ..Jay's experience and training and
his familiarity with the area of the subject property,
the trial court determined that his opinion as to whether the subject property was a good service station site
was legal evidence; but it was left to the jury to determine the value of such opinion. How much weight
the jury gave to :Mr.•Jay's opinion is not known: it
is noted, however, that on cross examination the defendants' counsel very skillfully pointed out the deficiencies
m Mr. Jay's testimony.
The defendants' contention.s that Mr. Jay was not
sufficiently familiar with the subject porperty, and
that he was not qualified to provide a foundation for
giving an opinion would be an argument only to the
weight of such testimony. It should be for the jury to
determine what weight, if any, should be given to the
testimony of any witness.

IV
REFERENCE MADE BY PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL TO THE JURORS AS TAXPAYERS WAS NO'l'
PRE.JUDICIAL TO DEFENDAN'rS' CASF, AND
THE DEFENDANTS DID NOT MAK:JiJ AN ORAlj
OBJECTION AT THE TIME SUCH REJMARK WAS
MADE, NOR DID THEY MOVE FOR A MISTRIAlj
OR INSIST ON A MORE SPECIFIC RULING WHEN
20

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT SATISFY THEIR
R.IDQUEST TO CORREcrr THE ALLEGED IMPROP-

ER REMARK, AND THE DEFENDANTS WAIVED
ANY OBJECTIONS TO THE ALLEGED IMPROPER
RF~MARK BY INCORPORATING THE SUBJECT
IN 'rHEIR CLOSING REMARKS BY WAY OF REBUTTAL.
At the beginning of his closing argument, counsel
for the plaintiff told the jury that the Marriott family
was entitled to receive just compensation but cautioned
them that it would be unjust to award a windfall at
the expense of the public purse. The exact text of the
statement regarding the public purse and taxpayers
appears m the official transcript in two paragraphs
(Tr. 182):
"Now, as members of the jury you are charged
with the responsibility of deciding the question
of what is just compensation. Now everyone
agrees that the Marriott family is entitled to
receive just compensation for this property being
acquired by the State Road Commission. On the
other hand, it would be unjust to award a windfall
at the expense of the public purse.
You people are taxpayers, all of us in this courtroom are taxpayers. Now, what is this phrase,
"just compensation" that has been mentioned
frequently. In this regard the court has instructed you that "just compensation" shall not exceed
the fair market value. Market value, you have
been told, is the sum of money a willing buyer
would pay a willing seller when both are fully
21

informed of the facts and neither is under am
·
compulsion to bu.Y or sell.''
Contrary to the defendants' interpretation of the
above quoted statement as an attempt to extract sym.
path~, and to appeal to the self interests of the jurors,
the argmnent is better advanced that the tenor of the
language is nothing more than an appeal to the jury to
be fair to both parties and award to the landowners ju8t
compensation. At no point in the argument was the idea
suggested that the jurors, because they have a remote
taxpayers interest, should resolve an:-' conflicts in favor
of the State Road Commission. Reference to the jurors
as taxpayers was only casually mentioned and it was
never stated that you taxpayers must pay for this as
indicated in the note given to the ;judge hy counsel for
the defendants. The subject of taxpayers was never
brought up again except in the rebuttal argument of
counsel for the defendants, at which time he emphasized the status of jurorn as taxpayers b~- devoting a
substantial portion of his rebuttal argument explaining how the money for the interstate freeway system
is raised. Some of the language used by counsel is found
in the transcript as follows:
"We are all taxpayers. Here in Ftah, here in
Weber County, Kentucky, New York, or all ovrr
the nation. These interstate freeways are utied
bv the entire nation, big interstate truckers, lo<'al
t~affie, everybody; you pay taxes, I pa>' taxrs
and so do the Marriotts, but I submit to yon
that it is entirely improper to raise this type

22

of an argument after the court has instructed
you that you cannot extend sympathy to the
property owner-to come in and have the State
expect sympathy is the basis, I submit to you,
for their case." (Tr. 189)
In view of the ('asual reference to the taxpayers
hy conmsel for the plaintiff compared to the remarks
ahout taxpayers of the counsel for the defendant on
rrlmttal, it is difficult to imagine how this exchange
could have been a positive factor in favor of the plaintiff's case. It is further suggested that when counsel
for the defendants incorporated this line of argument
in his rebuttal remarks, he abandoned or waived any
objections he might have perfected prior to that time,
since mutuality of misconduct may preclude the loser
from successfully claiming error.

The rule is recognized in most jurisdictions that
in order to preserve for review the question of conduct
or argument of counsel, an objection must be made promptly. 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal & Error sis 627 (1963). Since
the prejudicial effect of improper appeal.:; to the jurors
self interests can in many instances, effectively be cured
by prompt action by the trial court, ordinary rules for
preservation of the record should be applied. 3 Am. Jur.
Appeal & Error sis 375 (1941), 53 Am. Jur. Trial s/s
30fi (1941), Annot., 33 A.L.R. 2d 442 (1954). If
a proper objection has been registered by counsel, and
the trial judge did not make a ruling or the ruling did
not satisfy the objecting counsel, it is incumbent on the
23

objecting coum;el to direct the court's attention to the
matter if not satisfied and insist on a ruling or request
the court to make furtlrnr instruction whichever the case

1

may be. Binninqham v. Gonzale.z, 183 Ala. 27:3, 61 So. 80
(1913), Annot., 78 A.L.R. 1533 (1926), 3 Am. Jur. Appeal
& Error s/s 375 (1941), Gobrecht v. Beckwith, 82 N.H.
415, 135 A. 20 (1926), Annot., 52 A.L.R. 858 (1928),
Grahm v. State, 98 Ohio 77, 120 N.E. 232 (1918), Annot.,
18 A.L.R. 1272 ( 1922).

Many jurisdictions have held that a motion for a
mistrial, withdrawal of the jury or a request to the
court for such further action as may be necessary to insure a fair and impartial trial, is a condition for review on
appeal of alleged objectionable statements. 3 Am. Jur. ,
Appeal & Error, s/s 375 (1941). Annot., 108 A.L.R. 756,
757 (1937) states:

!

"Quite generally, however, it has been held
that where the trial court has sustained the opposing counsel's objections to alleged improper
remarks and has complied with such counsel's
request for an instruction to the jury to disregard
them, or that counsel be admonished or has refused to sustain the opposing counsel's objections to such remarks, the alleged objectionable
statements will not he reviewed upon appeal in
the absence of a request to the court for ;;;uch
further action as mav be necessarv to insure a
fair and impartial t;ial, such as ~ request for
further instructions to the jur~- or a motion for
mistrial, discharge of the jury, withdrawal of
a juror, etc .. "
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'l'he rational behind the above quoted rule is based
on the idea that the appellant court must infer that the
complaining counsel wa3 satisfied, and that he himself
dirl not consider the remarks in question to be seriously
prPjudicial to his client, or that he waived any objection.
Annot., 108 A.L.R. 763 (1937). The Utah case State v.
Christensen, 13 Utah 2d 224, 371P.2d552 (1962), appears
to be in line with the majority of the jurisdictions in requiring a motion for a mistrial or further pressing of
claim for prejudicial error. The Christensen case held
that even though the cross-examination of the State's
expert witness concerning severance damage paid by
the State for neighboring land was improper; such
impropriety did not constitute reversable error since
the State did not move for a mistrial or press claim of
prejudicial error until after the verdict was returned.

In the instant case, a 'vritten objection to statements
of counsel for the plaintiff was handed to the judge during the closing argument. At no time did the trial judge
make any comment to the jury about the contents of the
note. After the closing argument of counsel for the plaintif, the record does not show any instruction by the court
to the jury (Tr. 187). At the conclusion of the rebuttal
argument of the defendants' counsel, the trial judge admonished the jury as follows (Tr. 190):
"I caution the members of the jury, you are not
advocates. You are not advocates of the State
Road Commission. Yon are not advocates of the

private parties appearing here against the State.
In this case it is an opportunity--it doesn't matter
whether either side has or has not been fair. The
issue is market value.''
rrhe instruction above quoted was clearly in response
to the note handed to the judge during the defendants'
closing argument. In the defendants' statement of exceptions after the jury had retired, counsel recognized
that the court did admonish the jury but argued that
such admonition was not clear or strong enough (Tr.
192):
'' ... and we believe that the admonition should
have been much stronger and still ought to be
given substantially clearer than anything that was
mentioned to the jury at the close of the argument.''
Since counsel for the plaintiff did not request the
court to make further instruction or dictate to the judge
a requested instruction or move for a mistrial when
dissatisfied with the instruction given, it should be inferred that counsel was either satisfied with the instruction given, or he did not consider the remarks prejudicial to his case, or that he waived any objection.
Assuming for the sake of argument that proper
exceptions were perfected to preserve the question on
appeal, it is the position of the respondent that the alleged improper statement made was not prejudicial and was
harmless.
There is no serious dispute with the cases and auth-
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orities cited by counsel for the plaintiff in his discussion of point IV. It is argued, however, these cases are
distinguishable from the case at bar, and the cases which
were reversed solely on the grounds of improper argument were cases in which a substantial portion of the
closing argument was based on the idea that the jurors
as taxpayers have an interest in the outcome of the case.

It is also pointed out in each case that was reversed
rnl1d.v on grounds of improper argument, that the coun-

sel for the complaining party made oral objection and
requested that the remarks be stricken, and the trial
judge specifically over-ruled the objection and allowed
counsel to continue the objectionable line of argument.
Two of the cases cited in the Brief of Appellants
on page 25, were reversed for reasons other than imprnper argument, and the courts did not decide whether
the alleged improper remarks would alone entitle the
eomplaining party to a new trial. Sullivan v. County
of Allegheny, 187 Pa. super-370, 144 A.2d 498 (1958),
Mississippi State Highway Commission v. Hall, 252 Miss.
863, 17 4 So. 2d 488 (1965).

In the case of Eager v. Willis, 17 Utah 2d 314, 410
P.2d 1003 (1966), involving a personal injury action,
this Court concurred in the general rule that pleas plainly designed to elicit sympathy, passion and prejudice
~hould not be allowed. This Court in the Eager case also
pointed out that minor errors should be disregarded
27
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if it is reasonable to belie\'e that tht~ parties had an opp- I
ortunity to present their evidence and have a fair and '
impartial trial.
:
I

I
I

This Court stated in the case of Ivies v. Richardson, i
9 Utah 2d 5, 336 P.2d 781 (1959) that:
''Reversal of a judgement is justified only when
there is some error of such a substantial nature
that there is a likelihood that the result would
have been different in its absence.''

A statement is quoted on page 26 of the Brief of
Appellants which constituted grounds for reversal in
the case of Williams c. City Anniston, 257 Ala. 191, 58 So.
2d 115 (1952). The language used in the Williams' case
was then compared to the language used in the instant
case as interpreted and paraphrased by counsel for the
appellants. An examination of the -Williams' case reveals that the Alabama Supreme Court also pointed out
that each time the alleged improper statements were
made an objection was asserted, and in each instance
the court overruled the objection. 'The court then observed that these rulings emphasized the point and indicated '
to the jury that payment of the verdict from city funds
should be a consideration in deciding the case. Some of
the following points illustrate the distinction between
the Williams' case and the one at har:
1. In the case at har the alleged improper remark
was briefly stated once in counsel's introductory rema~ks to the jury. In the Williams' case
the objectionable line of argument was much
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stronger and constituted a substantial portion
of the counsel's closing argument.
2. There were several oral objections to counsel's
closing remarks in the Williams' case with the
trial judge each time emphasizing the point
by overruling imch objections. No oral objections were raised during the closing argument
in the case at bar, and the trial judge made no
rulings which emphasized the alleged objectionable statement.
3. In the Williams' case the jurors were vary
close to the municipal taxing. In the case at
bar the jurors were far removed from the governmental agency which pays 95% of the costs
to build the interstate system.
In the case of Anderson v. Santa Fe Trail Transp.
Co., 107 Utah 20, 151 P.2d 465 (1944), an argument was
made to the jury by the plaintiff that the bus company,
a foreign corporation, would pay any judgment and
that its property within the state could be levied upon.
To this line of argument the Utah Supreme Court on
page 464 of the Pacific Reporter states that:
"Fnless counsel, by such argument invited
or admonished the jury to resolve any doubt it
might have as to the facts in favor of the plaintiff in view of the financial responsibility of the
corporate defendant, it is difficult to see how the
jury might think jt relevant."
The announcement to the jurors that they are taxpayers should not have surprised or aroused their prejudices since they were well aware of their status. The
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Kentuckv.J Supreme Court made a co111111on sen·
•
~ e o b servation when it stated:
" .. .it must be assumed that the members of the
jury were reasonably intelligent men and knew
that a judgment against the commonwealth would necessarily have to be paid out of taxes collected by it." Commonwealth v. Hoover's Admi11istration, 274 Ky. 472, 118 S.W.2d. 741 (1938).
In the Brief of Appellants on page 28 and 29, the
cases of West v. State, 150 S."W.2d 3G3, (Tex. Civ. App.
1941), and Doty v. Jacksonville, 106 Fla. 1, 142 So. 599,
(1932), were cited for the proposition that highly prejudicial statements need not be objected to in order to
obtain a reversal. A reading of the objectionable statements quoted in the Brief of Appellants clearl~v reveal.5
that there is no comparability between these statements
and the statement made in the instant case. It is also
disputed that the last two cited cases held that prejudicial error resulted even in the absence of an objection.
In both cases the court specifically pointed out that objections were raised and overruled. In the vV est case the
exceptions were not asserted to the objectionable statement when made in the opening arguments, but the same
statements on closing argument were very strenuously
objected to and overruled by the court. It was the Supreme Court's position, that the objection had been properly raised but added by way of dictum that the state
ments were so prejudicial that a reversal should be required in the absence of an objection.
30

The written objections handed to the trial judge by
counsel for the defendants did not ask the judge to instruct the jury to disregard such statement, nor did it
request any other specific action but only asked the
trmrt to admonish. If the defendants were unhappy with
thr instructions given by the judge, or if they considered
that no instruction was made, there was plenty of opportunity before the jury retired to press for a specific
ruling or further instruction.

lt is submitted that the outcome in the instant case
would have been the same in the absence of the alleged
improper remark made by the plaintiff's counsel. The
transcript will show that the evidence was in favor of
the plaintiff's position. This was not the type of case
in which the jury was likely to compromise their verdict
between the position of the landowner and the position
of the Utah State Road Commission. Once the jury
was convinced that the site was not of the type that
would attract a $35,000 offer from a major oil company,
there was no place for them to rest their decision except
on the testimony of the witness used by the plaintiff.

v
PREJUDICIAL ERROR WAS NOT COMMITTED IN THE TRIAL COURTS INSTRUCTIONS TO
THE JURY.
The answer to the defendants' argument that no
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instructions were given which corrected the alleged irn.

proper remark of plaintiff's counsel or cautioned the
jury against sympathy and generosity toward the State,
is that the defendants did not request such instruction~.
Thi3 Court recently held in the case of the State of Utah .
by and through its Road Conmiission v. Kendall, No.
10834, March 5, 1968, that:
1

1

"The law is to the effect that where no request
is made for an instruction at trial, a party cannot complain on appeal because the court did not
give such unrequested instruction.''
The case of Salt Lake & U. R. Co. v. Schramm, et al., 56
Utah 53, 189 Pac. 90 (1920) stated that:
''If the plaintiff desired more specific instructions than given by the court, it became the duty
of the plaintiff to frame and present them for the
court's consideration. This the plaintiff did not
do ... not having made a written request to the
court to charge the jury in the particular3 complained of, the court's failure to do so will not be
regarded as an error ... " (56 Utah at 57).

Utah R. Civ. P. 51, also states that:
'' ... no party may assign as error the giving or the
failure to give an instruction unless he objects
thereto ... ''
One of the courts instructions did however caution the
jury to disregard the public character of the plaintiff
(Tr. 164) :
It is your imperative and sworn duty to he~ 1:
and determine this case precisely the same as 11
~2

it were between individuals. The mere fact that
the plaintiff is the State of Utah and the defendants are private individuals should make no dif ference whatever to you.
You should look solely to the evidence for the
facts and the instructions given you by the court
for the law and return a true and just verdict
according to the facts established by the evidence
under the law as laid down by the court, without
reference to the individual or private character
of the defendants or to the public character of the
plaintiff.
The defendants' contention that the trial court
emphasized, repeated and gave unbalanced instructions
in favor of the plaintiff is not supported by the record.
The trial court in both instructions No. 8 and 9 made
reference to burden of proof. 1~ven though the phrase
"burden of proof" is used in both instructions, it is
stated in different ways and the two instructions are
attempting to clarify a certain point. Instruction No.
8 talks about burden of proof generally and instruction
No. 9 set out an example for purposes of clarity.
It is submitted that the instructions of the trial court
should not he declared repetitious and prejudicial as
long as the instructions in question tend to add clarity
on a particular point. Only after the instructions in question cease to add clarity and only repeat the same thing
over ~everal times should the question of prejudicial
emphasis and repetition arise as grounds for reversal.
One of the trial court's instructions specifically caution33

ed the jury about instructions stated m varymg ways
(Tr. 164):
No. 17
''If in these instructions any rule, direction or
idea be stated in varying ways, no emphasis thereon is intended by me, and none should be inferred
by you. For that reason, you are not to single out
any certain sentence or any individual point or
instruction and ignore the others, but you are to
consider all the instructions as a whole and are
to regard each in the light of all the others.

The order in which the instructions are given
has no significance as to their relative importance.''
The defendants have cited several cases on page
34 and 35 in the Brief of Appellants in which the courts
have expressed their disapproval of instructions which
tend to give undue prominence or emphasis on a point
that is favorable to either side. The case of Evans r.
Holsinger, 242 Iowa, 870, 48 N.W.2d 250 (1951), was reversed for grounds other than emphasized instructions,
but the Iowa Supreme Court cautioned that the three
questionable instructions which were in essence dupli·
cates should be avoided on retrial. This Court in the
case of Shields v. Utah Light & Traction Co., 99 Utah
307, 105 P.2d 347 (1940), declared that it was error
for the trial court to permit portions of the city ordinance as well as identical sections of the statute to be
read to the jury together with an explanation of how
the laws were to apply to the facts.
34

The facts in the instant case are substantially
different from the facts in the Shields case and the other
eited cases in which the courts have ruled instructions
to be prejudicially repetitious. In the instant case
the two instructions in question should not be con8idered repetitious since they would both tend to clarifv
a particular point. Even assuming they were repeating to the jury the same proposition, it is evident that
the degree of repetition does not even approach the
point where it would likely have a prejudicial influence
on the outcome of the trial. This is particularly true
if the instructions are considered as a whole and no
individual point, instruction or sentence is singled out
as cautioned against by the trial court (Tr. 168).
The defendants have raised a vigorous objection
to lnstruction No. 8. This instruction tells the jury
to reject the contentions advanced by the defendants
if they find the evidence to be evenly balanced. The
defendants argue that this instruction made it mandatory for the jury to return a verdict on the figure testified to by either the defendants or the plaintiff.
The case of State of Idaho ex. rel. Rich v. Dunclick, Inc.,
ii Idaho 95, 286 P.2d 1112 (1950), is cited by the defendants in support of their assignment of error on this
point. In the last cited case the courts' instruction
~pecifically told the jury that if they find that the
landowners have not sustained the burden of proof in
Pstablishing value, then their verdict shall not be in
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excess of the state's values. rrhis instruction is the
"all or nothing" instruction which is snhstantially rlifferent from the instruction in the instant case. Then,
is nothing in the trial eourt 's instructions in the instant
case which suggests tliat the jm·y is bonnd to adopt
the figures of the plaintiff if the defendants have not i
met their burden of proof. On the contrary, if the
Instructions are considered as a whole as the trial conrt
instructed the jury to do, it will be observed that such
instructions gave the jury permission to arrive at an
independent figure. One of the trial court's instructions
to the jury stated (Tr. 172):
No. 21
. If you should decide that the defend"
ants are entitled to recover, in discussing the
amount of damages to he awarded, you prohahly
could ascertain from each juror his own independent judgment as to what the amount should
be. if vou should so wish to do . . . whereupon,
it wm{ld he your duty to thoughtfully consider
the amounts so suggested, to test them in the
light of the law and the evidence, and after de·
liberation thereon, to determine which, if any,
of such individual estimates was proper ... ''

Other instructions of the trial court clearly explain
to the jury that they are not bound b~T the opinion
of any witness:
'' . . . vou shonld consider snch expert opinion
and sho~lld weigh the reasons, if any, given for it.
You are not bound, however, by such opinion.
Give it the weight to which you deem it entitled.
~()

·whether that be great or slight, and you may
reject it if in your judgment the reasons given
for it are unsound" (Tr. 190).
''Where there is a conflict in the evidence,
you should reconcile such conflict as far as you
reasonably can, but where the conflict can"not
be reconciled, you are the final judges and must
be determined from the evidence what the facts
are. . . You are not bound to believe all that
the witnesses have testified to, or any witness
or class of witnesses ... " (Tr. 163).
The above quoted instructions clearly permitted
the jury to adopt a figure that is different from that
of either the plaintiff or the defendant. There is nothing in the instructions that suggests to the jury that
the plaintiff has devised a magical formula for determining market value which must be adopted if the
defendants fail to prove their case by a preponderance
of the evidence. The word rejection would properly
suggest to the jury that they cannot adopt the figures
of the defendants if the burden of proof has not been
met, but it certainly does not require or suggest the
adoption of the plaintiff's figures.

CONCLUSION
A discussion of the points in this Brief and a review of the record should clearly demonstrate that the
defendants had a fair trial with the opportunity to present all of their evidence to the jury.

It cannot be assumed that simply because the jurors

37

i

chose to adopt the figures of the plaintiff's expert wit- I
ness that their verdict was unfairly and prejudicially :
influenced. The defendants have argued numerous points i
which they feel have influenced the outcome of this ca~e. '
One controlling factor which has been grossly overlooked,
is the evidence itself which appear:::; to have been eclipsed
in a smoke screen of rntionalization and ·Monday morning quarterbacking. A review of the evidence presented
in this case will leave no doubt as to what factors rnoti
vated the jury to return a verdict exactly on the plaintiff's figures since the evidence was heavily in favor of
the plaintiff's position.
It is respectfully submitted that the parties presented two distinct alternatives for the jury. One alternative was to adopt the theory that the subject property
was a prospective site for a major service station. Thr
other alternative was to adopt the view that the subject
property was best suited for industrial and related activities. There was nothing in between on which the jurors

could rest their decision.
Respectfully submitted,

PHIL L. HANSEN
Attorney General

LYNN R. BROWN
Special Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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